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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is there substantial conflicting evidence for the 
Industrial Commission to reject the medical panel's report, the 
original treating physician's opinion, and the Administrative 
Law Judge's finding on the period of temporary disability from 
the accident. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, determines the out-
come of this case. The relevant parts state: 
. . . [T]he commission shall refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by 
the commission. . . . The medical panel shall make 
such study . . . and thereafter shall make a report in 
writing to the commission. . . . If no objections are 
so filed [to the medical panel report] . . ., the 
report shall be deemed admitted in evidence and the 
commission may base its finding and decision on the 
report of the panel, but shall not be bound by such 
report if there is substantial conflicting evidence in 
the case which supports a contrary finding by the 
commission. 
(See Appendix "A" for the entire text of the statute.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Background. 
This case arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Delbert W. Wallace ("Wallace") filed an application for hearing 
on December 14, 1983. (R. 9) The medical panel filed its 
report on October 30, 1984. (R. 170) No objections were filed 
to the medical panel report. (R. 197) On January 24, 1985, 
the Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order adopting the medical panel's report 
on temporary disability from the accident. (R. 196-204) On 
August 7, 1985, the Industrial Commission, with Chairman 
Stephen M. Hadley dissenting, entered an Order reversing the 
Administrative Law Judge on the issue of temporary disability 
by rejecting the medical panel report on temporary disability 
in favor of what they inferred a doctor's opinion would be. 
(R. 227-232) Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound") petitions for 
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the reversal of this Order and the reinstatement of the origi-
nal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 233) 
B. Facts. 
Wallace sustained an industrial accident with Greyhound on 
December 18, 1981, when he slipped on some ice on the step of a 
bus and fell. (R. 1) 
For seventeen years prior to this accident, Wallace had 
substantial back problems. In 1964 he injured his back while 
lifting. This required a laminectomy and discectomy. 
(R. 174) In 1967 he reinjured his back in an automobile 
accident. This lead to an L4 to SI fusion. (R. 174) Wallace 
reinjured his back in another automobile accident in 1969. 
(R. 174) In 1970 Wallace was thrown from a horse again injur-
ing his back. (R. 174, 175) While working in a nursing home 
in 1973, Wallace again injured his back. (R. 175) Wallace 
continued to receive extensive treatment for his back up until 
three days before his December 18, 1981, accident. (R. 99, 
175, 176) 
After the accident, Wallace treated with Dr. Culley K. 
Christensen on December 21 and 28, 1985. (R. 100) 
Dr. Christensen estimated Wallace would be off work about three 
months. (R. 101) On February 10, 1982, Dr. Christensen 
released Wallace to return to work. (R. 102) On May 10, 1982, 
Wallace saw Dr. Gene R. Smith for back problems. (R. 104) 
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Dr. Smith gave Wallace a return to work slip for May 22, 1982, 
even though he did not take him off of work. (R. 104, 105) By 
his own admission Wallace took only one week off the job after 
the accident until October 1982. (R. 173) 
In July 1982, Wallace again saw Dr. Smith for back pain. 
On October 18, 1982, Dr. Smith released Wallace from work. He 
was then referred to Dr. Grant L. Christian for treatment of an 
ulcer. (R. 114) On May 25, 1983, Dr. Smith stated that 
Wallace should be rated and trained for work other than bus 
driving. (R. 133) Dr. Smith was not aware that Wallace had 
already been retrained and that Wallace elected to perform the 
restricted work. (R. 181) At the request of Greyhound, 
Dr. Smith rated Wallace on November 29, 1983, while noting that 
his condition remained fairly well stabilized. (R. 138) 
In evaluating Wallace, the medical panel determined that 
there was "no evidence that his low back problem or lower 
extremity radiation problem was worsened by the accident." 
(R. 181) The medical panel further found that the accident 
caused a temporary aggravation of his pre-existing low back 
problems for about three months. (R. 182) All other treatment 
was "necessitated by pre-existing and subsequently developing 
conditions not caused by this industrial accident." (R. 182) 
When the Administrative Law Judge made his findings, he 
adopted the three-month temporary total disability period 
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suggested by the medical panel and the treating physician, 
Dr. Christensen. (R. 202) Although Wallace did object to a 
setoff for overpayment of benefits, no one objected to the 
temporary total disability period given by the medical panel 
and used by the Administrative Law Judge. After ruling in 
Greyhound's favor on a setoff issue, the Industrial Commission 
surprisingly addressed on its own the cutoff for temporary 
total disability. (R. 229, 230) By a vote of 2-1 the 
Commission rejected the three-month period. (R. 230) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The medical panel determined that the industrial accident 
caused a three-month aggravation of Wallace's long-standing 
back problems. When he began missing work again in late 1982, 
it was due to his seventeen-year history of back problems, not 
the industrial accident. The medical history as well as the 
treating physician's records (Dr. Christensen) agree with the 
medical panel report. The evidence does not support any other 
conclusion. 
Although the parties did not raise the issue, the 
Industrial Commission reviewed and rejected the medical panel 
report. Without explaining how the medical panel report was 
supposedly deficient or contrary to the evidence, the 
Commission used a letter of Dr. Smith to infer Dr. Smith's 
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opinion on temporary disability and medical causation. In 
doing so, the Commission erroneously assumed that the date a 
permanent rating is given is the date of medical stabiliza-
tion. They also subverted the evidentiary process for receiv-
ing medical testimony. And finally, the inference that 
Dr. Smith would find the medical stabilization date to be the 
date of the rating letter contradicted the letter itself as 
well as the rest of Dr. Smith's records. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND MEDICAL PANEL 
REPORT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS 
ONLY A THREE-MONTH TEMPORARY DISABILITY FROM 
THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
An employee injured by accident in the course of his 
employment is entitled to compensation for the period he is 
temporarily disabled. U.C.A. § 35-1-65. Temporary disability 
ends when the condition caused by the accident becomes medi-
cally stable. 2A Larson, The Law Of Workmen's Compensation 
(1981) § 57.12. Since medical stabilization is a medical 
question, it may be addressed by a medical panel. 
Being at issue, the medical panel properly addressed 
temporary disability and concluded: 
. . . [Wallace] would [be] entitled to an approximate 
three month's course of conservative treatment for 
temporary aggravation of his lumbosacral spine 
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problem . . . the rest of the treatment would appear 
to have been necessitated by pre-existing and subse-
quently developing conditions not caused by this 
industrial accident. (R. 182) 
No objections were filed to the medical panel report so it 
was admitted into evidence. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-77, the 
Industrial Commission must accept the medical panel report 
unless there is substantial conflicting evidence. The medical 
evidence here substantially supports the medical panel report 
on temporary disability. First, Wallace actually returned to 
work well within that time. (R. 173) Second, the treating 
physician, Dr. Culley K. Christensen originally estimated a 
three-month disability. (R. 101) Third, Dr. Christensen 
returned Wallace to work well within the three-month period. 
(R. 102) Fourth, when Dr. Gene R. Smith first saw Wallace in 
May 1982, after the three-month period, he did not then take 
Wallace off of work. (R. 104, 105) Fifth, when Wallace later 
went off work in October 1982, it was for the medical problems 
which pre-existed the industrial accident for which he had 
received treatment for seventeen years prior to the industrial 
accident. (R. 173-183) 
The medical panel report and medical evidence substantially 
support the finding that there was only three months of tempo-
rary disability caused by the accident. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S REJECTION OF THE 
UNCONTESTED MEDICAL PANEL REPORT MISCON-
STRUES THE NATURE OF A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 
RATING, VIOLATES STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR 
RECEIVING MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND MISINTERPRETS 
DR. SMITH'S RECORDS. 
Since no one challenged the medical panel's conclusion on 
temporary disability from the accident, it was very surprising 
to see the Administrative Law Judge reversed on this issue. 
The net effect and apparent reason for the reversal was to 
obliterate Greyhound's credit for continuing payment pending a 
final resolution. The reasoning offered is very questionable. 
The Commission claimed that Dr. Smith gave no release to work 
date, the usual evidence of medical stabilization. They 
observed a letter of Dr. Smith dated November 29, 1983, giving 
Wallace a permanent impairment rating. Recognizing that medi-
cal stabilization must occur before permanent impairment is 
rated, the Commission concluded that the date of the rating 
letter was the date of stabilization. (R. 230) 
The most glaring deficiency in this reasoning rests on the 
assumption that the date a permanent impairment rating is given 
coincides with the date of medical stabilization. Although 
this may happen, it is not necessarily true. As finally deter-
mined, Wallace had an impairment from his first surgery in 
1964. However, no rating was given until 1983. It would be 
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ludicrous to assert that he did not stabilize until the 1983 
rating was given. Many cases come to the Industrial Commission 
where medical stabilization has occurred but no permanent 
rating has been given. The Commission has never suggested that 
until a rating is given there is no medical stabilization. 
To compound this error, the Commission inferred Dr. Smith's 
opinion on medical stabilization in violation of statutory and 
Commission procedure and without considering all of Dr. Smith's 
records. 
Commission procedure requires that any objections to the 
medical panel report be filed in writing. When objections are 
filed, an evidentiary hearing is held to examine and cross-
examine the medical witnesses. In this manner, medical issues 
in dispute can be fully and properly reviewed. U.C.A. 
§ 35-1-77. Since no objections to the medical panel report 
were filed, the various medical witnesses were not examined. 
Had they been, Dr. Smith could have directly addressed the 
issue of medical stabilization as well as the medical cause for 
treatment in late 1982 and early 1983. In rejecting the medi-
cal panel's report when no objections were filed and then 
inferring what a physician's opinion would be, the Commission 
subverted its own and statutory procedure depriving Greyhound 
of the opportunity to obtain Dr. Smith's direct opinion. 
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Even if it were proper to infer what Dr. Smith's opinion 
would be, the Commission should at least have carefully studied 
the letter upon which they relied as well as the other records 
of Dr. Smith. Had they done so, they would have found that the 
November 29, 1983, letter condemns their reasoning. The second 
paragraph reads in its entirety: 
The status remains fairly well stabilized in my 
opinion. (R. 138) 
That the status "remains" fairly well stabilized rules out any 
possibility that stabilization occurred on the date of the 
letter. Dr. Smith's records also reveal that Dr. Smith thought 
Wallace was medically stable when he first saw him in May 1982 
(R. 104, 105) and again in May 1983 when Dr. Smith recommended 
a rating be given. (R. 133) 
The erroneous logic, improper procedure and inaccurate 
facts of the Industrial Commission show there is nothing to 
support the Industrial Commission's rejection of the medical 
panel report. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Industrial Commission finding a temporary 
disability cutoff date of November 29, 1983, should be rejected 
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and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated 
January 24, 1985, should be reinstated. 
DATED this *— day of January, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Henry 
Attorneys 
Inc. 
yhound Lines, 
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35-1-77. Medical panel—Duty of commission to refer case to powers of 
panel—Findings and report—Objections to report—Hearing—Expenses.— 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the em-
ployer or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission shall refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion and having the qualifications generally applicable to the medical 
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The medical panel shall make such study, take such X-rays and perform 
such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine and thereafter shall make a report in 
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and 
shall make such additional findings as the commission may require. The 
commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel 
to the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is de-
posited in the United States post office, the claimant, the employer or 
the insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing 
thereto. If no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be 
deemed admitted in evidence and the commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if 
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the case which supports 
a contrary finding by the commission. If objections to such report are 
filed it shall be the duty of the commission to set the case for hearing with-
in thirty days to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such 
hearing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the 
chairman of the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission may order other 
members of the panel with or without the chairman, to be present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the 
written report of the panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be 
considered as evidence in the case except in so far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical 
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of 
the fund provided for by section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "appli-
cant" for "claimant" in the third and fourth 
sentences; deleted "within thirty days" after 
"set the case for hearing" in the sixth sen-
tence; and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy. 
"APPENDIX A" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served four copies of this Brief on 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, 543 E 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, Attorney for Delbert W. Wallace, the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Hearing Room, 160 East 300 South P.O. Box 5800, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110-5800 and Second Injury Fund, 160 East 300 
South P.O. Box 5800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800, by causing the 
same to be placed in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid. 
